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Abstract: Intelligent sensors experience security problems very similar to those inherent to 
other kinds of IT products or systems. The assurance for these products or systems creation 
methodologies, like Common Criteria (ISO/IEC 15408) can be used to improve the 
robustness of the sensor systems in high risk environments. The paper presents the 
background and results of the previous research on patterns-based security specifications 
and introduces a new ontological approach. The elaborated ontology and knowledge base 
were validated on the IT security development process dealing with the sensor example. 
The contribution of the paper concerns the application of the knowledge engineering 
methodology to the previously developed Common Criteria compliant and pattern-based 
method for intelligent sensor security development. The issue presented in the paper has a 
broader significance in terms that it can solve information security problems in many 
application domains.  
Keywords: Common Criteria; information security; IT security development; intelligent 
sensor; design pattern; knowledge engineering 
 
1. Introduction 
Progress in sensor technology and increased interoperability have made sensor systems more 
complex, more efficient and allowed them to reach new application domains. Sensor systems are 
integrated with other complex IT systems, creating huge collaborative systems. The flow of the 
collected information, its processing and decisions based on these data, co-ordination and co-operation 
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with complex IT systems–all are based on dependable solutions. Information security and operation 
continuity issues are very important for sensors and sensor systems, especially for those working in  
high-risk environments. Numerous collaborative sensors applications operate in these environments, 
so their security issues should be considered with special attention during their development.  
The paper concerns generally the information technology (IT) security development methodology 
compliant with ISO/IEC 15408 Common Criteria (CC) [1,2], but is focused on the implementation of 
this methodology in intelligent sensors. Earlier papers [3,4] introduced the patterns-based IT security 
development method and discussed its validation on two different kinds of sensors, i.e., a mote-based 
medical sensor remotely monitoring patients and a methane detector working in a coal mine 
environment. The objective of this paper is to improve the introduced method by using possibilities 
and advantages offered by the knowledge engineering approach.  
The risk inherent in IT products or systems, including sensor systems, can be mitigated by different 
measures, such as the measures built into these products and systems. The question is whether the 
users can rely on these measures in critical circumstances, when certain threats occur. In this case the 
methodology providing assurance, like the Common Criteria methodology can be helpful. Assurance is 
understood as a situation when an IT product or system meets its security objectives which are related 
to the built-in measures or the measures applied in the product or system operational environment. The 
term assurance means that the implemented measures will be able to counter threats when they occur. 
According to the Common Criteria paradigm the source of assurance are: the rigour applied during the 
development and manufacturing processes, independent third-party evaluation as well as the operation 
and maintenance according to the received certificate. These specially developed and evaluated IT 
products and systems can operate in a higher risk environment. The Common Criteria standard, 
broadly used for years and still being improved, can be applied to different groups of IT products 
(hardware, software, firmware) and systems. Each of them is called TOE, i.e., target of evaluation. 
Apart from typical IT product/system categories [2], like operating systems, data bases, software 
applications, network equipment, security-related products, chip/RFID cards, etc., quite new, emerging 
standard applications appear. The intelligent sensors and sensors systems can be considered one of them.  
Intelligent microcontroller-based sensors are able not only to measure a physical quantity and to 
convert it into a signal which can be read by an observer or instrument, but also to process measured 
values and to send them to other sensors or applications. Usually sensors are organized in the form of 
sensor systems, based on the network technology, including the wireless technology. With respect to 
the CC methodology, intelligent sensors can be considered IT products, being a part of a broader IT 
system, and for this reason the IT inherent risks should be considered for sensors as well.  
There are more and more intelligent sensor implementations on the market. Still, the number of 
completed Common Criteria certification processes of these products has not followed suit. This is 
typical of emerging CC application domains. Many factors may change this situation. One of them, 
related to the motivation for this paper, is providing intelligent sensor systems developers with 
methods, tools and knowledge, helping them effectively use the Common Criteria methodology in 
their R&D works. The provided method is based on the Common Criteria related IT security design 
patterns developed and validated in [3,4]. The paper shows that these patterns can be implemented in 
the Protégé Ontology Editor and Knowledge Acquisition System from Stanford University [5] and 
demonstrates how to apply these patterns in the IT security development process. The ontology-based Sensors 2011, 11 
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model of the IT security development process made with the use of the general purpose Protégé tool as 
well as experimentations on the model in the intelligent sensors domain are elements of a broader 
feasibility study to provide input for currently elaborated knowledge-base software supporting IT 
security developers. Due to different limitations, the basic version of the Protégé tool cannot be used 
by IT security developers as a tool for end-users. The application of the knowledge engineering 
methodology should improve the preciseness, consistency and reusability of the CC-compliant IT 
security development. The paper has an interdisciplinary character and is related to the author’s earlier 
works dealing with: 
•  the Common Criteria methodology improvement by introducing the CC-related security design 
patterns and the IT security development process automation; 
•  patterns-based intelligent sensors IT security development; 
•  knowledge engineering methodology application in the IT security domain. 
Each of these issues needs a short introduction and a review of the author’s earlier research works 
with respect to similar research run by other authors.  
1.1. Common Criteria Methodology and Its Extensions 
The reader is encouraged to browse the Common Criteria primer [3](Section 3), extended   
in [4](Section 2) and supplemented there by the Common Criteria related terms and acronyms. More 
information about this methodology can be found in [2,6,7]. The Common Criteria (CC) methodology 
encompasses three main processes: 
•  the IT security development process, generally leading to the elaboration of the security 
specification called security target (ST), which defines the TOE built-in security functions; 
•  the TOE development process, related to the IT product or system development with the use of 
an assumed technology, including its security functions implementation at the claimed EAL 
level; the elaborated documentation, later used as evaluation evidences, comprises: the TOE 
development and guidance documentation, life-cycle definition, configuration management, 
delivery, flaw remediation, development security, testing, and vulnerability assessment issues; 
•  the IT security evaluation process, performed by an independent body, leading to certification. 
The paper concerns the first process, which consists of the following stages: the security problem 
definition, security objectives, security requirements and the TOE security functions work-out. The CC 
standard provides the security functional (SFR) and assurance (SAR) components as the specification 
means for security requirements. Specification means for other stages, which are called generics, are 
defined by developers in a different way that causes problems for the common understanding and 
preciseness of the specification means. The author has introduced semiformal generics, called 
“enhanced generics”, which do not have this limitation, enabling to create more precise and compact 
security specifications [7-9]. Enhanced generics, expressing common security features and behaviours, 
have features similar to those of CC components, allowing parameterization, derivation, refinement 
and iteration. These works concern the UML/OCL-based IT security development framework (ITSDF) 
encompassing models of data structures and subprocesses related to the IT security development Sensors 2011, 11 
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process. The ITSDF framework was implemented in the computer tool supporting IT security 
developers. The author’s defined enhanced generics and CC-defined components can be considered 
the Common Criteria related security design patterns (shortly: “CC-related patterns”), which are 
discussed in [3,4] in the context of intelligent sensors. Please note that these patterns concern the 
means used in the security specification building. 
1.2. Security Design Patterns and Common Criteria Related Security Design Patterns 
Engineers from different technology domains, including information technology, elaborate, use and 
improve their own design patterns, which are considered reusable, proven solutions to problems with 
respect to a given context. The author’s defined CC-related patterns, focused on the Common Criteria 
compliant IT security development, are more specific than the commonly used “design patterns” or 
“security design patterns”. The latter concern IT solutions, including security related solutions.  
An extensive discussion of security design patterns can be found in [10]. These architectural 
patterns for software application concern different issues like: the enterprise security and risk 
management, identification and authentication, access control models and systems or operating system 
access control, accounting facilities, firewall architecture, secure Internet applications, IP telephony, 
and cryptographic key management. 
The effectiveness of the use of security patterns with respect to design phases is discussed in [11]. 
The book [12] presents the UML extension called UMLsec, providing a unified approach to the 
security features description during the secure IT system development. UMLsec can be used to define 
different kinds of patterns, e.g.,: secure channel, TLS Internet protocol, electronic purse, secure Java 
programs, bank applications, biometric authentication systems, electronic signature, etc. The patterns 
defined there can be analyzed with the use of the method provided by [7] with respect to the CC 
methodology.  
The above discussed security patterns, most similar to the patterns introduced in the paper, are 
related to the security features of IT solutions, especially software architectural solutions. Please note 
that they do not concern the CC methodology. The patterns presented here can be considered their 
extensions.  
1.3. Knowledge Engineering Approach in IT Security Domain 
Patterns encapsulate engineering knowledge and experiences, and the specific knowledge is needed 
to use them to achieve the expected solution of a design problem. A natural way is to use the 
knowledge engineering methodology to manage design-related knowledge. It allows one to obtain 
additional advantages offered by the knowledge engineering approach.  
Knowledge bases may be elaborated with the use of ontologies. In computer science and 
information science “an ontology is a formal representation of the knowledge by a set of concepts 
within a domain and the relationships between those concepts. It is used to reason about the properties 
of that domain, and may be used to describe the domain” [13]. Ontologies have recently found 
application in many disciplines where “a common understanding”, “a common taxonomy” or 
“reasoning” are important, including: web-based applications, medicine, public administration, 
biology, and information security. Similar needs exist in the IT security development/evaluation Sensors 2011, 11 
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domain. For this reason the research on applying the ontology-based method in this domain may bring 
new advantages.  
The presentation of the knowledge engineering principles and the elaboration of ontologies and 
related knowledge bases is included in the paper [14] and in the documentation available free of charge 
together with the Protégé tool [5]. 
The first results of the author’s research in this field were presented in [15], discussing selected 
issues concerning the Specification Means Ontology (SMO). The paper [16] presents the SMO 
validation on the firewall example, while [17] concerns its validation on the motion sensor example. 
SMO was extended to the IT Security Development Ontology (ITSDO), expressing the IT security and 
TOE development (evidences) processes. ITSDO is equipped with a rather huge number of enhanced 
generics (ca. 350 items). They have general character and can be used for typical IT products or 
systems.  
The experiences gained during the validation show that it would be more convenient to define 
subsets of generics for specific application domains. The paper is focused on defining and 
implementing the first of them—the subset for intelligent sensors development, elaborated on the 
results of the papers  [3,4]. The previously elaborated CC-related design patterns will be here 
implemented as knowledge base items. 
The introduced CC-related design patterns base on the specialized security ontology. A short 
overview of research works on security ontologies will provide suitable background for the presented 
research and development focused on the ontological approach to the discussed domain.  
The first group of reviewed R&D works, most relevant to the presented paper, concern the 
ontological approach to the Common Criteria (ISO/IEC 15408) implementation: 
•  the paper [18] discusses an ontological model of the CC functional components mapped to the 
security objectives with the use of a specialized tool; it concerns only one stage of the IT 
security development process, omitting others; 
•  the paper [19] presents an ontological model of the CC assurance components and a query-
based tool which supports evaluators in planning the evaluation process, retrieving relevant 
documents or creating reports; it is focused on the IT security evaluation process only, omitting 
the IT security development. 
The above papers do not consider the entire IT security- and TOE development processes and are 
not focused on the elaboration of CC-related design patterns specific for some kinds of products or 
systems, such as intelligent sensors.  
Some existing ontology-related research works deal with risk management issues: the work [20] 
discusses the quantitative risk analysis, the work [21] concerns the ontology-based selection of 
controls, while the paper [22] focuses on an ontology-centred technology risk management 
architecture for banking applications. The monograph chapter [23] introduces an ontology and 
knowledge base related to the advanced security trade-off methods which allow to classify these 
methods, to order their properties and to help select a right method for the given application.  Sensors 2011, 11 
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Some papers are strongly related to the information security management systems, especially those 
compliant with ISO/IEC 27001 [24], or business continuity management systems compliant with 
BS 25999 [25].  
Additionally, many common security issues ontologies [26-30] are elaborated, specifying different 
security terms and relationships between them, like: threats, attacks, policies, security of services, 
security agents, information objects, security algorithms, assurance and credentials, etc. A good 
example of this kind of work is the paper [31], discussing security and trust ontologies which 
encompass risk analysis issues, security algorithm taxonomy, security functions, attacks and defence, 
and trust. The number of elaborated security ontologies is growing and they cover all security relevant 
issues. None of these works is focused on the CC-related security design patterns, especially those for 
the intelligent sensors applications.  
1.4. Paper Contents—A Continuation of the Previous Research 
The paper is based on the author’s previous research works on IT security of sensors. The work [3] 
discusses architectures, applications and security issues, including the analysis of threats specific for 
sensors and their systems. On this basis a generalized intelligent sensor model and, related to it,   
CC-compliant intelligent sensor security model were elaborated. With respect to these models the  
CC-related security patterns were defined, expressing basic security features and behaviours of 
intelligent sensors. The set of patterns was validated on the intelligent medical sensor example and 
improved on this basis. The work [4] provides an improved notation of patterns and their semantics. 
Another revision of patterns was done on the basis of the validation on other design example. This 
time the validation concerned an intelligent methane detecting sensor for mines. Summing up, the 
works [3,4], allow one to properly define the CC-related security patterns and validate them on varied 
intelligent sensor projects.  
Applying knowledge engineering methods in different application domains usually brings 
advantages such as better design preciseness, common understanding of terms, improved design 
reusability and automation, and better project knowledge representation. The paper considers the 
possibility to achieve these advantages with respect to the Common Criteria application domain. 
The paper’s contribution can be expressed as the knowledge engineering methodology application 
for the intelligent sensors security development. The research and development objectives of the paper 
are: 
•  to provide a complete, ontological representation of the CC-related patterns; 
•  to provide a method to use them as knowledge base items for the security specifications 
elaboration; 
•  to evaluate these results on some examples. 
The indirect, far-reaching objective is to provide such improved patterns, and the related knowledge 
how to use them, to a broader group of developers of intelligent sensors and sensor systems.  
The Common Criteria IT security development process is complicated, needs specialized 
knowledge and is poorly supported by specialized software tools. Better support of this process and 
improvement of its effectiveness with respect to the time and cost are still considered challenges. Sensors 2011, 11 
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Different efforts and research works in this area are in progress [32]. The author’s works concern these 
challenges but are restricted to a specific kind of IT products—intelligent sensors and their systems. 
The novelty of the paper related to the knowledge engineering methodology application in the 
Common Criteria standard domain concerns two main elements:  
•  CC-related patterns for sensors expressed as knowledge base items to specify completely 
security models for sensors, validated on a real methane detecting sensor in a mine; 
•  validation of the ontological model of the IT security development process as contribution to 
develop a professional tool for IT security developers. 
The author provides a new category of security design patterns—the CC-related items, defined as 
knowledge base items, which can be used to specify security properties and behaviours of any 
intelligent sensor or sensors system. The ontological representation of these patterns creates new 
possibilities to build security specifications: developers obtain a set of predefined, optimized, sensors-
focused specification items supplementing the CC-defined components. Generally, such patterns 
improve the IT security development process because developers are provided with well defined and 
ready-made solutions of elementary security issues. The CC-related patterns for intelligent sensors and 
sensors systems have not been developed yet. They encompass all IT security development stages (not 
only the selected ones, as presented in [18,19]) and the sensors-related domain is considered one of the 
emerging applications in the Common Criteria standard. Introducing ontological representation of 
these patterns gives additional advantages related to better automation and intelligence of this process.  
The author’s research aims generally at the elaboration of a software tool to support IT security 
developers. The paper presents research works on the knowledge engineering methodology application 
to build such a tool. The research area has an innovative character—so far one knowledge base system 
for IT security development process has been elaborated [33], however it does not use any ontology. 
Besides, only two CC-related ontologies were elaborated (Section 1.3, [18,19]) but they represent only 
selected parts of the IT security development process. The empirical evaluation of the ontology-based 
model of the entire IT security development process was not performed before. For the empirical 
evaluation the well known Protégé tool is used. It allows one to create fast prototypes, to check 
different variants, to assess these variants, to experiment, and to obtain a lot of other useful 
information on the ontological model properties and behaviour. It is convenient for ontology 
developers’ experimentations but not for IT security developers as end-users. The aim of this 
evaluation with the use of Protégé tool, summarized at the end of the paper, is to work out some input 
to develop a software tool supporting IT security developers [34]. 
The paper contains two key sections. Section 2 discusses the ontology and knowledge base 
development process. Section 3 shows some examples presenting the ontology, related knowledge 
base and their use in the intelligent sensors security development. The additional, last section 
concludes the applied approach and planned works. Sensors 2011, 11 
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2. IT Security Development Ontology (ITSDO)—Version Focused on the Intelligent Sensors 
Security Development 
The IT Security Development Ontology (ITSDO) encompassing security patterns for sensors has 
been elaborated according to the basic knowledge engineering rules [14] and with the use of the 
Protégé Ontology Editor and Knowledge Acquisition System developed at Stanford University [5]. 
ITSDO is expressed by the OWL language, precisely by the OWL-DL (OWL—Web Ontology 
Language, DL—Description Logics). This OWL version allows automatic reasoning. The iterative,  
top-down ontology development process encompasses steps presented shortly in Subsection 2.1 
through 2.7. Selected results of this process are shown in Section 3. The paper presents the ITSDO 
version that was slightly improved with respect to the validation on intelligent sensors (the range of 
improvements: [4]/Subsection 3.2).  
2.1. Definition of the Ontology Domain and Scope, and Competency Questions 
The domain of the ITSDO ontology is constituted by the Common Criteria compliant IT security 
development and the TOE development processes, but the paper concerns the former process only and 
focuses on the security patterns for sensors. ITSDO provides common taxonomy for specified items, 
allowing one to better understand them and better express relationships between them. Important 
issues concerning the ontology domain are competency questions [14] which are defined as questions 
that the ontology related knowledge base is able to answer. These answers define the scope of the 
ontology. Please note that ontologies and their knowledge bases are developed incrementally, and after 
exceeding “a critical mass” a knowledge base allows to get answers to more and more advanced 
questions. The ITSDO knowledge base prototype is able to provide answers to basic questions related 
to the security development of any IT product or system though examples presented in the paper are 
focused on sensors. 
The UML activity diagram shown in Figure 1 presents particular stages (subprocesses) of the   
CC-compliant IT security development process. The research is focused on the four most complicated 
stages where the ontological approach can be most suitable, i.e., the security problem definition, 
security objectives, security requirements and the TOE security functions work-out. The key 
requirements for the ITSDO ontology domain are: 
1.  The ITSDO ontology should be able to express the entire IT security development process 
aimed at the elaboration of the security target (ST) specification for any IT product or system 
(TOE), i.e., it encompasses the entire Common Criteria applications domain. ITSDO includes 
the ST hierarchical structure, expressing its parts and relations between them, e.g., the security 
problem definition, security objectives, security functional and assurance requirements, and of 
course their parts, e.g., threats, OSPs and assumptions as the security problem definition (SPD) 
parts, etc. These “parts” play the role of containers for security-related data for different IT 
products or systems. It implies the need to define the second group of terms used as the 
specification means for these containers; Sensors 2011, 11 
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2.  The ITSDO ontology should be able to express the specification means for a given family of IT 
products or systems, here: “the intelligent sensors and sensors systems”. The Common Criteria 
specification means include: general-purpose functional and assurance components (defined in 
the CC) and TOE security specific generics: for threats, security policies, assumptions, 
objectives and functions description (i.e., the here discussed CC-related patterns for intelligent 
sensors and systems); 
3.  The ontology should express two kinds of relationships existing in the IT security model of an 
IT product or system. The vertical relationships express relations between particular ST parts 
(containers) and specification means, placed into these containers. For example, we can put 
threat-type generics as specification means into the threats specification, which is considered a 
container. The horizontal ones express relations between specification means belonging to the 
neighbour levels of the security model, e.g., between any threat-type generic and a security 
objective-type generic which counters it; 
4.  The ITSDO ontology should be able to demonstrate generally the ability to retrieve knowledge 
within the domain to assess the needs and expectations of IT security developers with respect 
to this issue, mostly the ability to retrieve all relationships within the project between any 
elementary security problem (threat, OSP, assumption) and its solutions, refined step by   
step—starting from security objectives, through functional requirements, to security functions 
implementing the requirements (and to evidences showing their implementation—not 
discussed in this paper). Retrieving may also concern finding some items of given 
characteristics to solve any security issue or to refine a given security issue. The retrieving 
allows to compare different solutions or their parts, helps to assess the completeness of 
solutions or find redundant solutions, etc. Generally, the retrieving should be able to support IT 
security developers in typical activities; 
5.  The ITSDO ontology should be able to implement the reasoning possibility in the future to 
research IT security developers’ needs and expectations with respect to this issue. To ensure 
this and to make the elaborated models more precise in the future, the OWL-DL is preferred; 
6.  ITSDO work-out should allow: 
•  experimentations on the model of the IT security development process, on sensors 
example—to identify the basic concepts concerning this process and the relations   
between them. 
•  the elaboration of the ontological model of the sensor/sensors systems domain, its 
validation in the sense of an adequate ontological representation of this domain,   
and finally its application in the elaborated software tool supporting sensors   
systems developers. 
7.  ITSDO will be implemented in the Protégé environment; 
8.  The self explanatory names of classes, properties and instances allow developers (humans) to 
better understand the terms during experimentations on security models. Sensors 2011, 11 
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Figure 1. The CC-compliant IT security development process as a UML activity diagram. 
 
2.2. Considering the Possible Reuse of Existing Ontologies 
Reusing (integrating) the existing ontologies into the created one can speed up the ontology 
development process, can extend the ontology scope and the range of its applications. During the 
review of the paper-related R&D works (Section 1.3) two reusable ontologies [18,19] were 
encountered. The integration may be restricted to the Common Criteria components only, but reusing 
cannot be considered here because these ontologies are not publicly available. 
2.3. Identifying Important Terms in the Ontology 
The basic set of important terms encompassed by the ITSDO ontology was identified during the 
ontology domain analysis performed while the UML/OCL models of the ITSDF framework were 
elaborated [7]. With respect to the intelligent sensors domain of application the basic terms expressing 
threats, security policy rules, assumptions, security objectives and functions are identified in the   
papers [3,4]. The identified terms are used here to define the ontology classes and their properties. Sensors 2011, 11 
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2.4. Definition of Classes (Concepts) and the Class Hierarchy 
ITSDO is developed iteratively with the use of a typical top-down approach with certain bottom-up 
activities. The right knowledge representation, as the sensors security patterns, requires the analyses of 
terms and relations between terms to properly express such relations as: class-instance, class-subclass 
and class-superclass, and to decide what should be expressed by a class and what by a property, what 
by abstract classes and what by classes which have instances [14]. While elaborating the ontology 
class hierarchy, the possibility of its future evolution should be considered. Most class names are self 
explanatory, though their lengths should be limited.  
2.5. Definition of Class Properties and Their Restrictions 
Classes can have some properties assigned. Three kinds of properties can be distinguished [14]:  
•  object-type properties (also called “instance-type properties”) are used to express “complex 
properties”, i.e., relationships between an instance of the given class (the object) and other 
instances; the two following situations are typical: the first one occurs when the given instance 
consists of other instances, the second one when the instance points to other instances; an 
instance-type property is attached to the classes which are called a domain; the classes indicated 
by this property are called a range; 
•  data-type properties are used to express “simple properties” or “attributes”, i.e., intrinsic or 
extrinsic properties of the instances of the most elementary classes; these properties are 
expressed by data types commonly used in modelling or programming, e.g.,: integer, byte, float, 
time, date, enumeration, string, etc.; 
•  annotation, RDF-based (RDF means Resource Description Framework) properties, are used to 
document different ontology items (classes, properties, instances); the most known example  
of this property is the rdfs:comment property which gives more explanation of the given   
ontology item.  
For properties, the restrictions can be defined. They specify or limit a set of possible values for the 
given property. The ITSDO ontology uses all types of properties (it will be exemplified in Section 3). 
The defined properties are also self-explanatory. The properties contents expresses the features of the 
sensors design patterns. 
2.6. Creating Instances and Filling in Their Properties 
Instances represent non-abstract class members. For ITSDO the instances are defined mainly for the 
classes of the lowest hierarchy level. The instances with filled-in properties represent the key Common 
Criteria methodology artefacts, like CC components, CC-related design patterns and evaluation 
evidences. The instances with their properties expressing relationships constitute the ITSDO-related 
knowledge base. Some auxiliary instances of abstract meaning are used to organize the knowledge 
base. The instances of classes representing threats, security policy rules (OSPs), assumptions, security 
objectives, and functions represent sensors-specific design patterns. The instances of the functional 
and assurance CC components have general meaning and can be used for any IT products or systems. Sensors 2011, 11 
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2.7. Testing and Validation of the Developed Ontology 
During its elaboration, the ITSDO ontology was tested—to avoid commonly known errors 
discussed in [14], and validated—to assess its usability. The Protégé environment provides some 
facilities to support these experiments. Testing is done with the use of menu options: “Checking 
consistency” and “Run ontology tests”. Certain tests are performed manually in the form of ontology 
inspections supported by OWLViz—a built-in visualization tool (plug-in). During the validation 
process the user checks if the right structures of instances are composed, if they have assumed 
properties, if the needed information can be retrieved properly by queries from the knowledge 
database, and if the forms are properly defined. The ITSDO ontology validation encompasses the basic 
scenarios of the ontology use.  
3. Knowledge Base Presentation and Use in the Intelligent Sensors Security Development 
The developed ontology and related knowledge base need validation. The paper presents selected 
experiments which should get the answers, whether: 
•  the CC-related design patterns are enough to fully specify security features and behaviour of 
sensors with respect to the Common Criteria methodology. 
•  the knowledge encompassed by this specification can be managed, i.e., introduced, modified, 
replaced, retrieved, etc. 
The selected issues of the ontology validation process will be exemplified by the Protégé tool and 
discussed in [4] the Methane Early Detection Intelligent Sensor (shortly: MEDIS). From the point of 
view of the Common Criteria methodology this sensor is considered the TOE (target of evaluation). IT 
security developers should elaborate a security target document and evaluation evidences for the TOE.  
Example 1. Knowledge base representation of the MEDIS security target. 
The Protégé tool is designed to develop and manage ontologies and related knowledge bases of 
different application domains. One of the ontology examples is the ITSDO ontology developed by the 
author and related to the Common Criteria methodology. Figure 2 presents three important panels of 
the Protégé tool. On the left, the Class Browser shows the class hierarchy. The ITSDO classes are 
subclasses of the basic OWL class called Thing. The main ITSDO classes are: 
 
•  AuxiliaryConcept, used for ontology organization; 
•  CCSecComponent, representing the CC-defined security assurance- [1]/part 3 and security 
functional [1]/part 2 components; they are used as specification means patterns for security 
requirements placed in the security targets and protection profiles structures; 
•  EnhancedGeneric, representing the author’s defined patterns for assets (DAgrGeneric), subjects 
(SgrGeneric), threats (TgrGeneric), policies (PgrGeneric), assumptions (AgrGeneric), 
objectives (OgrGeneric), and functions (FgrGeneric) [3,4]; 
•  SecurityTarget,  ProtectionProfile,  LowAssST,  LowAssP, expressing the patterns of the   
CC-defined documents of security requirements [1]/appendices in the part 1;  Sensors 2011, 11 
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•  ST_PP_Part, expressing parts of the above mentioned documents of security requirements; 
•  EvidenceDoc, EvidenceGuide, EvidenceTemplate, concerning evaluation evidences; generally 
EvidenceDoc expresses the TOE evaluation evidences elaborated with the use of patterns 
(EvidenceTemplate) and methods (EvidenceGuide); this kind of evaluation documents   
patterns [35,36] is not discussed in this paper. 
Please note the classes hierarchy, i.e., classes having subclasses that can be viewed when clicking 
on the triangle symbol.  
Figure 2. The MEDIS security target viewed in the Protégé tool [5].  
 
 
For the highlighted SecurityTarget class its instances (marked as rhombuses) are shown in the 
middle panel (the Instance Browser). One of the five security target instances is the considered 
ST_MEDIS security target. For this selected instance its details are shown in the right panel (Individual 
Editor panel; please note that Protégé uses the older term “individual” instead of the OWL term 
“instance”). Each part of the security target is expressed by one object property value, being an 
instance. Apart from the parts requested by the CC standard, additional information about the product 
category, project, claimed EAL and evidences is also expressed by object-type properties. In the upper 
part of the panel the annotation property (please note: rdfs:comment) presents auxiliary information 
about the MEDIS project and the related security target.  Sensors 2011, 11 
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Example 1 shows how the CC basic security specification, i.e., security target, can be precisely 
expressed with the use of the knowledge engineering approach. Using the predefined ST structure (that 
can be considered the evaluation document pattern) the IT security developer creates the security 
target instance and its parts for different TOEs, including the MEDIS sensor. Each part has been 
refined according to the top-down methodology. The ST introduction is rather trivial (textual 
description of the TOE and its ST). The first important section elaborated by the developer is the 
security problem definition (SPD). This example has general character—in the same way any security 
target, not only that of sensors, can be expressed. 
Example 2. The security problem definition and solution. 
Please note that the ontological top-down model considers all details of the given ST part (Figure 
2). By clicking on any instance, its details, also represented by properties, can be observed. For 
example, by clicking on the SecProblemDef_4MEDIS instance (Figure 2), the security problem 
definition for the MEDIS sensor is displayed in a pop-up window of the Protégé tool (Figure 3).  
The SPD includes its general description, placed as a text within the SPDdescription data property. 
Please note the specification of assets (the hasProtectAssets object property with multiple values 
allowed) and refinements of some assets (please note the assetsRefinem data property). Particular 
items within this property represent design patterns specifying different examples of the sensors 
related assets. Similarly, other enhanced generics, as knowledge base items (patterns), representing 
legal subjects, threat agents, assumptions, OSPs (Organizational Security Policies), and threats are 
placed in the right properties.  
For example: 
•  the asset pattern DTO_SensorData  expresses all data sampled and processed by the   
MEDIS sensor; 
•  the subject pattern SNA_HighPotenIntrud represents an attacker having high level skills, 
enough resources and deep motivation to perform a deliberate attack against MEDIS and 
the sensor system where this sensor works; 
•  the threat pattern TDA.DisruptSampling concerns the situation where “Users or intruders 
could try to manipulate the sensor input causing wrong input data”. 
Please note that patterns expressed as ontology items (instances) comply with their traditional 
definitions (as enhanced generics) presented in the paper [4]. 
The entire SPD, as an ontology item, is annotated by its rdfs:comments property. The IT security 
developer analyzes the security problem and specifies it using enhanced generics expressed as 
knowledge base items (CC-related design patterns).  
The SPD problem is solved by specifying security objectives for the TOE and/or for its operational 
environment. The IT security developer analyzes particular threats, OSPs and assumptions and assigns 
to each of them one or more security objectives for the TOE and/or its environment using enhanced 
generics, i.e., CC-related design patterns.  
 Sensors 2011, 11 
 
 
8099
Figure 3. The MEDIS security problem definition in the Protégé tool [5]. 
 
Figure 4. The threat representation in the knowledge base [5]. 
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One of the analyzed threat examples, TDA_Access, is shown in Figure 4. This pop-up window is 
displayed by clicking on the TDA_Access instance from the hasThreats property (Figure 3). The threat 
TDA_Access represents scenarios where “Users or intruders could try to access sensor functions or 
data they are not allowed to”. 
The IT security developer analyzes the meaning of the threat (the hasDescription property), 
threatened assets (sensor data and services) and possibilities of threat agents (attack potential), 
exploited vulnerabilities, and finally assigns some security objectives using the isCounteredBy 
property: 
•  providing sensors with properly managed unique identifiers (OIDA_ControlID); 
•  controlling by means of sensors the access of connected entities (OACC_Access),  
•  auditing any attempts to undermine the sensor security and tracing them to the associated 
entities (OADT_Audit);  
•  implementing procedures of sensor network administration and security policy 
(OSMN_NetAdmin). 
Assigning one or more security objectives is identified as the solution of the elementary   
security problem. Additionally, a simple risk analysis is possible which is made to compare different 
threats with respect to the event likelihood and the threatened asset value, both assessed with the use of 
the predefined enumerative scales. Assuming that in this project the event likelihood and the related 
asset values (both assets considered together) are assessed in the range: 0–5, the risk as their product is 
measured in the range: 0–25. The risk concerning TDA_Access is 10/25 (40% of the maximum value in 
this project). This simple risk assessment facility allows to order threats by risk, and this ordering 
gives useful input for the applications of measures by assigning security objectives.  
Example 3. Specifying the security objectives for the MEDIS sensor. 
Solving fully the SPD, a complete set of security objectives is reached, as it is shown in Figure 5. 
Security objectives represent safeguards built into the TOE (the hasSO4TOE multiple-valued property) 
or applied within the TOE operational environment (the hasSO4TOE_OpEnv multiple-valued 
property). In the next stage of the IT security development the first group will be expressed by the 
security functional requirements (SFRs) and implemented later within the TOE security functions. The 
second group will be refined in different documents (evaluation evidences provided for the IT security 
evaluation/certification process–not discussed here).  
The  SecObjectives_4MEDIS instance (Figure 5) expresses these both groups of objectives. As 
usual, some of them are refined to better express the project needs. The security objectives should be 
justified as a whole (the SecObjRationale property)–the justification has not been finalized yet by the 
IT security developer in this project.  Sensors 2011, 11 
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Figure 5. The MEDIS security objectives in the Protégé tool [5].  
 
Example 4. Specifying security requirements for the MEDIS sensor. 
The security objectives for the TOE should be expressed in a unified, semiformal way with the use 
of CC-defined functional components [1]. To obtain the security functional requirements specification, 
each TOE security objective is analyzed by the developer and one or more security functional 
components are assigned to it. This analysis is performed within a certain context defined by the SPD 
elements and the risk. At this stage of the IT security development, the security functional components 
play the role of CC-related security patterns.  
Figure 6 shows two aforementioned instances of security objectives countering the TDA_Access 
threat and the security components assigned to them. OACC_Access is represented by components 
responsible for the user identification (FIA_UID_2) and for defining and executing the access control 
policy (FDP_ACF_2,  FDP_ACC_2) [1](part 2). The OADT_Audit security objective, supporting 
OACC_Access, is represented by components responsible for the audit data generation (e.g., when 
access is violated) and audit data analysis (FAU_GEN_1, FAU_SAA_1) [1](part 2). Sensors 2011, 11 
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Figure 6. Specifying the functional security requirements for the security objectives using 
the tool [5]. 
 
Example 5. Specifying the security functions which implement functional requirements. 
Analyzing each TOE security objective, the IT security developer expresses, step by step, the entire 
security functional requirements specification with the use of patterns. Here functional components 
play the role of patterns. The Common Criteria standard requires to perform the rationale of this 
specification as well.  
Figure 7. The security functional requirements and their particular components. 
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The left part of Figure 7 presents a complete set of security requirements for the MEDIS sensor. 
The security assurance requirements are specified by declaring the Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL), 
here: EAL2. Please note that the given EAL implies the proper package (set) of SARs [1](part 3). The 
right part of this figure presents the FDP_ACC_2 components details. Please note the security 
objectives which address these components (OACC_Access, OIDA_ControlID) and the SFTA_AccCtrl 
security function which implements them (pointed by the isImplementedIn property).  
Example 6. Finalizing the IT security development process. 
The IT security development process is finalized by the TOE summary specification (TSS) work-out. 
This specification includes all security functions needed to implement the security functional 
requirements on the assumed EAL level. For this stage the patterns were defined as well, though they 
are used rather as examples to define specific functions meeting IT product/system requirements [4].  
The left part of Figure 8 presents the TSS (the TSS_4MEDIS instance) for the considered MEDIS 
sensor, i.e., functions (pointed by the hasSF property) responsible for access control, reliable data 
processing, secure communications, ensuring robustness and providing audit facilities for the MEDIS 
sensor. These functions will be implemented on the EAL2 level of assurance. The right part of   
Figure 8 presents general specification of evaluation evidences (the hasBacicEvidence property). 
Issues dealing with evidences are not discussed in the paper. 
Figure 8. Specifying security functions and evidences [5]. 
 
 
Please note that only basic evaluation evidences are specified (it means: no additions, no 
substitutions are presumed for the MEDIS [1](part 3)). Evaluation evidences concern: architecture, 
interfaces, decomposition, guidance documentation, configuration management, delivery procedures, 
testing, and vulnerability assessment—all of them on the EAL 2 level assurance components.  
Particular evidences, identified as instances, are described in separate documentations whose 
structures and contents are the subject of the project [34]. Sensors 2011, 11 
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Example 7. Knowledge retrieving and analyzing during the IT security development process. 
The developed CC-related design patterns placed as the knowledge base items allow to issue 
security specifications of different IT products or systems.  
These items, and relations between them, represent the project knowledge. The project data 
elaborated on the patterns basis can be easily modified or reused for other projects. The relations 
between project items can be analyzed with the use of a simple query option of the Protégé tool.  
Let us assume that the IT security developer looks for threats with the risk value higher than 2 in 
the predefined scale. Figure 9 shows the applied query example retrieving 3 threat cases which satisfy 
this condition. Next, the developer intents to analyze one of them, e.g., TDA_Access, asking about 
security objectives countering this threat.  
Figure 9. Project knowledge retrieving with the use of a simple query tool [5]. 
 
Figure 10. Project knowledge retrieving with the use of a simple query tool [5]—a continuation. 
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In Figure 10 the first query line retrieves these four objectives. One of them is OADT_Audit. Asking 
about functional components related to the audit, the developer adds the second line of the query 
(using the option “Match Any”) and obtains two components: FAU_GEN_1 and FAU_SAA_1. The 
queries can be stored and managed by the Protégé Query Library. They can be organized 
hierarchically—a query can search for items within the results of other query. The query facility is 
rather simple and may not satisfy all IT security developers. 
4. Conclusions 
The paper concludes research on a special kind of security patterns designed to elaborate the 
Common Criteria compliant security specifications for intelligent sensors. Earlier papers [3,4] defined 
and validated these patterns on real examples of sensors, while this work is focused on the ontological 
representation of these patterns to achieve extra possibilities and advantages offered by the knowledge 
engineering methods. The validation presented in the paper ought to provide an answer if these 
advantages are achieved.  
At the beginning of the paper, the research background was discussed. Then the elaboration of the 
ontology and the related knowledge base dealing with the paper contribution were concisely presented. 
This elaboration is based on the commonly used Protégé tool. The key section of the paper concerns 
the exemplification of the created ontology on the IT security development process. 
4.1. Summary of Validation Example 
The Methane Early Detection Intelligent Sensor (MEDIS), discussed in the paper [4], was chosen  
as the object of validation. The reader can compare both variants of the applied IT security   
development process:  
•  performed manually, but patterns-based, described in [4], and, 
•  the ontology-based variant, discussed here 
The presented validation shows how the key security issues can be expressed using the ontological 
representation of the CC-related security patterns. During the validation, the MEDIS security target 
was developed step by step. The security problem definition (SPD) requires to identify the threats, 
organizational security policies and assumptions for the TOE. In the same way, the method proposed 
here allows to specify the active entities (legal subjects, threat agents) and passive entities (protected- 
and threatened assets). Both these entities can be used as parameters values for the SPD items. For 
each elementary security issue its elementary solution in the shape of a security objective was 
formulated. Then particular security objectives were transformed into security functional components. 
Their implementation, in the form of technology-dependent security functions, was shown as well.  
All these issues were specified precisely and concisely with the patterns defined as the ITSDO 
knowledge base items (instances) and the relations between these items (properties). The basic 
examples of these relationships are: 
•  the parameter and the value substituted to it; for example, most of the threat patterns have 
parameters: Sparam [4], representing a threat agent and Dparam [4], representing a threatened 
asset; the given threat pattern expresses a certain group of similar malicious behaviours (attack Sensors 2011, 11 
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methods); using the threat pattern, the developer can specify the concrete threat case by 
substituting these parameters with concrete subjects and/or assets and by adding optionally the 
TOE-specific details as the threat refinement; the parameter value substitution is implemented 
with the use of an object type property (Figure 4, the hasThreatAgent and threatenedAsset 
properties); refinement is expressed, for example, by a data property (Figure 3, threatsRefinem);  
•  the elementary solution to the elementary security problem; it may concern the assignment of 
one or more security objectives (for the TOE and/or for the TOE operational environment) to 
any threat, OSP and/or assumption; it is implemented by non-functional (i.e., having multiple 
values possible) object properties (Figure 4, the isCounteredBy property, Figure 6, the 
countersThreat property);  
•  transforming TOE security objectives into security functional requirements (Figure 6, the 
isAddressedBySFR property), as well as the implementation of the SFR within the TOE security 
functions (Figure 7, isImplementedIn) are very similar issues to the above mentioned mapping 
of the elementary solution to the elementary security problem;  
•  miscellaneous relations example, like: assigning the EAL level to the TOE design, assigning the 
implied evidences to the claimed EAL, expressing the security assurance requirements 
(components) of the given EAL package, and many others.  
The data properties are as useful as the object properties. The data properties are used especially to 
assign textual descriptors to the main ontology items. The refinement operation is based on this 
property type too (Figures 3 and 5). The MEDIS security target does not use iteration though this 
operation is possible. The iteration is carried out by placing into the security specification many instances  
of the same pattern with different parameter values substituted and/or with different refinements.  
The validation, focused on the MEDIS security target, concludes that all issues of this security target 
can be expressed with the knowledge base items derived from the ITSDO ontology. Generally, two IT 
security development processes variants, i.e., the one based on patterns [4] and the other based on the 
ontological representation of the patterns, are convergent, but the latter one offers extra advantages 
related to the ontological approach discussed in the next subsection. The ontological approach allows to 
elaborate the conceptual security model of the sensor with the use of patterns and relations between them. 
This model facilitates security analyses supporting the security target work-out. 
The ITSDO ontology was shown from the ontology development tool perspective. The readers can see 
domain concepts and relations through the rather friendly GUI (Graphical User Interface) of this tool. It 
is good for the experimentations on ontologies (different variants can be checked) but it cannot be used 
directly by the sensors and security developers (uncontrolled data change possibility). In reality the tool 
is based on the formal specification of the ontology expressed in the OWL language. To exemplify the 
ITSDO ontology representation, the paper is supplemented by two simple examples. The readers should 
be familiar with the basics of the XML, RDF, RDFS (RDF Schema) and OWL notations. 
Example 8. The ontology TEO_Generic class representation (please refer to Figure 2, The   
Class Browser). 
A part of the ITSDO ontology presenting the TEO_Generic class is listed below (starting from the 
<owl:Class rdf:ID="TEO_Generic"> tag, ending at the </owl:Class> tag). This class is a subclass of Sensors 2011, 11 
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TgrGeneric, representing any kind of threat. The class has 2 comments assigned, the first one says that 
it concerns attacks against the TOE environment, while the second one that formerly this class was 
called “TIT”. Further we can see that this class is disjointed with the TES_Generic and the 
TDA_Generic, described elsewhere.  
<owl:Class rdf:ID="TEO_Generic"> 
<rdfs:subClassOf> 
<owl:Class rdf:ID="TgrGeneric"/> 
</rdfs:subClassOf> 
<rdfs:comment rdf:datatype=http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string  
>Threats against the TOE operational environment</rdfs:comment> 
<rdfs:comment rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" 
>former TIT</rdfs:comment> 
<owl:disjointWith> 
 <owl:Class rdf:ID="TES_Generic"/> 
</owl:disjointWith> 
<owl:disjointWith> 
<owl:Class rdf:ID="TDA_Generic"/> 
</owl:disjointWith> 
</owl:Class> 
Example 9. The hasThreatAgent object property representation (please refer to Figure 4 to see   
this property). 
Please note that this property expresses the relation between any threat (the TgrGeneric class—a 
domain) and its threat agent, being any subject-type generic (the SgrGeneric class—a range). This 
relation is inverse to the usedAsThreatAgent relation. The discussed relation belongs to a broader 
group of relations called objects4SpecMeans.  
<owl:ObjectProperty rdf:about="#hasThreatAgent"> 
<rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#TgrGeneric"/> 
<rdfs:range rdf:resource="#SgrGeneric"/> 
<owl:inverseOf rdf:resource="#usedAsThreatAgent"/> 
<rdfs:subPropertyOf rdf:resource="#objects4SpecMeans"/> 
</owl:ObjectProperty> 
4.2. Summary Concerning the Elaborated Ontology 
The paper presents multidisciplinary research and development works encompassing mainly the 
security engineering and knowledge engineering domains. The paper presents works focused on the 
sensor and sensors system security development. The motivation of the paper was to improve the  
CC-compliant IT security development by applying the knowledge engineering methodology and to 
support the Common Criteria application in the intelligent sensors development domain, including 
collaborative sensors applications.  Sensors 2011, 11 
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The mentioned improvement may concern the preciseness, consistency and reusability of the   
CC-compliant IT security development, better design knowledge management and providing this 
knowledge for developers. All of them are related to the typical advantages brought by the ontological 
approach [14]: 
1.  The elaborated ITSDO ontology, in the same way as many others, enables common 
understanding of the terms in the ontology domain, i.e., terms related to the Common Criteria 
methodology. The paper concerns the IT security development process only, though this 
ontology is broader and encompasses the evidences and their elaboration as well as 
management. With respect to the IT security development process, ITSDO defines precisely 
the security specification structures and the specification means represented here by the CC 
related security patterns. The relationships between these patterns, like: “counters”, “enforces”, 
“upholds”, “addresses”, ”implements”, etc. are important too. This common understanding of 
the structure of information concerns mostly people (i.e., IT security engineers, evaluators, 
users and other stakeholders, called CC consumers). 
2.  Generally, ontologies facilitate the reuse of domain knowledge. In the considered case, the CC 
related security patterns (CC—defined components and author’s defined enhanced generics) 
can be used for other sensors projects. The ITSDO knowledge base can be considered a library 
of predefined patterns for sensor and sensor system applications.  
3.  ITSDO, similarly to many other ontologies, allows to make explicit assumptions for a domain. 
It deals mainly with predefined relationships facilitating the security target development,   
e.g.: mapping a typical solution to the given elementary security problem, mapping typical 
security functional requirements (SFRs) to the given security objective, proposed 
implementation of the given SARs by the security function. The predefined relationships are 
based on the experience gained with previous projects. The developer can use these 
relationships or can add new ones. These assumptions made with respect to the intelligent 
sensors security features can be considered an important kind of design knowledge. Generally, 
the IT security development process is supported by disseminating this experiences-based 
knowledge to other developers.  
4.   The considered ontology is able to separate domain knowledge (items related to specification 
means as a whole, designed to use in many different projects) from operational knowledge 
(how to use this domain knowledge to compose a new security target or protection profile 
document). It facilitates the automation of the most repeatable activities of the IT security  
development process. 
5.  ITSDO, as many other ontologies, supports the analyses of the domain knowledge, like 
supporting a simple risk analysis to consider some variants of security solutions. Generally, it 
facilitates the automation of the most difficult activities of the IT security development process, 
though this issue needs further research. Sensors 2011, 11 
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4.3. Future Development and Implementation 
The ITSDO ontology and related knowledge base are still under development. This is an iterative 
and incremental process, beginning with the basic concepts and properties. As more complicated 
concepts, properties and restrictions are added, the ontology is getting more matured and is able to 
express more sophisticated relationships and to get answers to more advanced competency questions. 
These initial efforts are considerable but further automation effects, reusability and preciseness, 
balance these efforts. Currently the R&D activities are focused on: 
•  the extension of the reasoning capabilities allowing more sophisticated competency questions; 
•  the elaboration of subsets of patterns for domains of application other than sensors; 
•  the ontological representation of the evaluation evidences patterns, concerning evidences 
elaborated on the ST basis during the IT product or system (TOE) development and provided 
for the IT security evaluation process. 
The validation of the IT security development process ontology-based model with the use of the 
Protégé tool and the intelligent sensors security domain shows that: 
•  all advantages and possibilities offered by the ontological approach, summarized in this section, 
may be achieved with respect to the IT security development process; 
•  the ontology-based model of the IT security development process fully expresses the 
developers’ needs and expectations (precise modelling of the complex domain, possibility to 
elaborate the security target for a given sensor completely, retrieving data to build the TOE 
security model, reusability); although the ontology encompasses the entire development process 
and sufficient specification means, the reasoning has not been developed yet but it will be 
possible in the next version thanks to OWL-DL; requirements related to the reasoning need 
further research. 
The elaboration of the ontology-based model of the IT security development process with the use of 
the general purpose Protégé tool, along with the experimentation on the model and the intelligent 
sensors domain, were elements of the feasibility study allowing to define assumptions for the currently 
elaborated knowledge-base software supporting IT security developers. The readers, such as sensors 
developers and security developers who are not familiar with the knowledge engineering basics, get an 
exemplification of their well known security issues in the environment which is quite new for them. 
The experimentations with security ontologies are based on the Protégé 3.x version, because it was 
stable when the experimentation started and it had sufficient possibilities for this purpose. Other   
OWL-based tools can be used as well, like: Protégé 4.x [5], Semantics works [37], NeOn Toolkit [38], 
TopBraid Composer [39].  
The ITSDO ontology was developed using the tutorial [14] and other documentations of the Protégé 
community, like [40]. The author wants to point out other references concerning the ontology 
development, e.g., Staab et al. [41] (the formal basis, tools, approaches in different ontology 
application domains), W3C consortium documents concerning the semantic web [42] (standards, 
drafts) and many other publicly available papers and guides on the above mentioned ontology-related 
tools.  Sensors 2011, 11 
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Currently the ITSDO ontology is used as a conceptual model for the CCMODE (Common Criteria 
compliant, Modular, Open IT security Development Environment) R&D project [34]. The objective of 
the project, co-financed by the EU within the European Fund of Regional Development, is to work out 
a CC-compliant methodology and tools to develop and manage development environments of IT 
security-enhanced products and systems for the purposes of their future certification. The basic 
products of the CCMODE project will be the following: knowledge, patterns (including 
documentation, procedures, evidences, specification means, etc.), methodology and tools used to 
create and manage development environments by different business organizations. The IT products 
and systems developed in these environments, having measurable assurance (EAL), can be certified 
and used in high risk applications. 
The CCMODE project assumptions and first achieved results were presented at the 11th 
International Common Criteria Conference [35]. Providing IT security developers with the Common 
Criteria related security design patterns and knowledge how to use them allows to: 
•  facilitate and speed up the IT security development process;  
•  improve the quality of evidences, because they are more consistent and include all details 
required by the considered assurance components and best practices; 
•  computer support of the IT security development process. 
The results of the R&D on ITSDO are used in the CCMODE project, especially to elaborate 
knowledge engines, evaluation evidences patterns, and supporting tools. Additionally, these results are 
used in other IT security related projects to provide solutions which could mitigate risk and ensure 
business continuity in an organization. 
 The CCMODE tool will be based on the D2R platform [43] and the broker technology. It allows 
uniform access to different specialized knowledge bases—one of them will support the IT security 
development process, others concern the IT product or system elaboration and their evaluation 
evidences, site-certification issues, selecting the right EAL for the TOE, and the internal organization 
and management of the entire development environment. The IT security development process is 
expressed by stereotyped UML classes in the Enterprise Architect tool [44], based on the data 
(enhanced generics—here discussed, components) retrieved from the knowledge base and dedicated 
plugin, and provided through the broker. The CCMODE different data are specified in RDF, RDFS, 
OWL and are identified with the use of URI (Uniform Resource Identifier). Ontologies as the upper 
layer have been elaborated using the Semantic works [37] tool—the whole system is implemented in 
the Java technology.  
Summing up, the major contribution of the paper is to provide an ontology-based method and tool 
to elaborate and manage the specific security design patterns for the Common Criteria compliant IT 
security development. By applying a knowledge engineering approach to the Common Criteria 
domain, the author’s works aim at providing developers with: design patterns, methodology, tools and 
related knowledge, which all help to elaborate required security specifications. 
The Common Criteria related design patterns were elaborated through the generalization of sensors 
functionality, architecture, known attacks, policies, etc. [3]. The set of design patterns for security 
specifications (enhanced generics) was validated on a few examples of sensors. The validations give 
input for the optimization of this set. Currently it encompasses representative items which are enough Sensors 2011, 11 
 
 
8111
to specify security issues of intelligent sensors and sensors collaborating with each other in broader IT 
systems, though this set is open to new security problems, their solutions and technological advances. 
The introduced ontological representation of these patterns gives extra advantages brought by this 
approach. The security of sensors and sensors systems enables their new applications, where risk 
issues are important.  
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